In this paper we investigate the logical decidability and undecidability properties of relativity theories. To this end, we need to recall versions of relativity theory which are built up in a logical framework i.e. which are theories in the sense of mathematical logic (section 2). In Part I (section 3) we investigate decidability properties of versions of relativity. We will find that the answer whether decidable or not depends on how rich version we study. We also study applicability of Gödel's incompleteness theorems to relativity. In Part I we study applicability of the conclusion of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem to the theory in question. In Part II (section 4) we study whether Gödel's second incompleteness theorem applies to the theory of relativity in question (we mean whether the conclusion of Gödel's theorem applies). In Part III (section 5) we study unprovability of consistency. The same investigation leads up to asking whether the theory is Π 0 k hard. This leads up to statements (possible predictions) in the language of relativity which are independent of ZF set theory.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate the logical decidability and undecidability properties of relativity theories. (Relativity comes in many stages, e.g., special, general, or cosmological relativity.) To this end, we need to recall versions of relativity theory which are built up in a logical framework i.e. which are theories in the sense of mathematical logic. Such are available in the literature, e.g., Specrel of [2] or [4] or [18] , or Genrel of [18] or [3] , to mention a few. We start this paper by recalling such logical forms of relativity theory (section 2). In Part I (section 3) we investigate decidability properties of versions of relativity. We will find that the answer whether decidable or not depends on how rich version we study. Also in Part I we study applicability of the conclusion of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem to the theory in question. In Part II (section 4) we study whether Gödel's second incompleteness theorem applies to the theory of relativity in question (we mean whether the conclusion of Gödel's theorem applies). In Part III (section 5) we study unprovability of consistency. In more detail, we discuss the property of a theory T saying that consistency of T , Con(T ), is formalizable in T but not provable from T . We look at the question which versions of relativity have this property. The same investigation leads up to asking whether the theory is Π 0 k hard. (We could call this "third Gödel incompleteness" property.) Roughly speaking, for all three questions we will find that the most sparing versions of relativity have the property (e.g., are decidable) while the richer versions of the same theory have the negative properties (e.g., undecidable). This leads up to statements (possible predictions) in the language of relativity T which are independent of ZF set theory. Independence of set theory motivates our arguing that relativity theory should not aim for proving such statements.
Basic axiom system

The frame language
We introduce the first-order logic language, which we will use for formalizing (first special) relativity, with an eye open for the subsequent generalization of the theory. We want to talk about motion of bodies. 1 What is motion? It is changing location in time. Therefore we will talk about bodies, time, space, and about a location-function which tells us which body is where at a given time. We want to talk about relativity theories; therefore these location functions will depend on observers; different observers may see the same motion differently. (The location function determined by an observer m will be called the world-view function w m of observer m.) We will treat observers as special bodies whose motion will be represented exactly the same way as that of the rest of the bodies. These observers are often called, in the literature, reference frames. 2 It will be convenient for us to be flexible about the dimension of space: we will not only treat 3-dimensional space, but 1 or 2, or higher-dimensional spaces as well. We will treat time as a special dimension of space-time. n will denote the dimension of our space-time. 3 Thus, usually n = 4 (3 spacedimensions and 1 time-dimension), but we will consider also n = 2, 3 or n > 4. Our bodies will be idealized, pointlike.
The vocabulary of our language is the following: unary relations
B (bodies)
Obs (observers)
P h (photons)
Q or F (quantities used for giving location and "measuring time");
an n + 2-ary relation, the location-or world-view relation W (world-view relation, W (m, b, t, s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ) intends to mean that according to observer (or reference-frame) m, the body b is present at time t and location ⟨s 1 , . . . , s n−1 ⟩);
for dealing with quantities, we will have two binary functions, and a binary relation:
1 In this paper we concentrate only on kinematics; the same kind of investigations can be carried out concerning mass, forces, energy etc., cf. [5] . However, if a theorem can be proved without referring to these extra notions, we consider that a virtue.
2 This difference is only a matter of linguistic convention. 3 Recent generalizations of general relativity in the literature (e.g. M-theory) indicate that it might be useful to leave n as a variable.
In our theories, we will always assume the following:
• observers and photons are bodies, We found that the simplest way of treating these assumptions is to use a 2-sorted first-order language, where B, F are sorts or universes,
Obs, P h are unary relations of sort B,
+, · and ≤ are operations and relation of sort F . 
Next we introduce some terminology in connection with arbitrary framemodels M = ⟨B, Obs, P h; F, +, ·, ≤; W ⟩.
The essence, the "heart" of a frame-model is the world-view relation W .
Thus w m (p) is the set of bodies present at space-time location p for m. We call a set of bodies an event, and w m is called the world-view function of m, which to each space-time location p tells us what event observer m observes or "sees happening" at location p. "Seeing" has nothing to do with photons here, it really means "coordinatizing" only.
The trace or world-line of a body b according to an observer m is the set of space-time locations where m sees b, i.e.
The world-view function w m can be recovered from the family of traces of all bodies (from ⟨tr m (b) : b ∈ B⟩), and the world-view-relation W can be recovered from all the world-view functions (from ⟨w m : m ∈ Obs⟩). Thus we can "represent" the function w m by the world-view of m, which is just the indexed family ⟨tr m (b) : b ∈ B⟩, and which, in turn, we represent by drawing the traces of bodies that we are interested in. See Figure 2 .
Since F = ⟨F, +, ·⟩ is a field, we can define n-dimensional straight lines as follows (these will be the world-lines of "inertial bodies"). We will use the vector-space structure of n F, i.e. if p, q ∈ n F and λ ∈ F then p+q, p−q, λp ∈ n F and 0 denotes the origin, i.e. 0 = ⟨0, . . . , 0⟩, where 0 is the zero-element of the field. Let ℓ ⊆ n F . We say that ℓ is a straight line iff there are p, α ∈ n F such that α ̸ = 0 and 
Basic axioms of special relativity
A plurality of "competing" axiom systems (or "relativity theories") is an essential feature of a logical analysis of relativity as developed in e.g. [4] . In this section we recall one of these axiom systems and will call it Specrel 0 . It consists of five axioms. In the following axioms, m, k stand for arbitrary observers, h for an arbitrary body, ℓ for an arbitrary straight line (i.e. element of Lines), and ph for an arbitrary photon. We use the standard custom in logic that free variables should be understood as universally quantified, e.g., the axiom tr m (m) = t means (∀m ∈ Obs)tr m (m) = t. Our first axiom says that the traces of observers and photons, as seen by any observer, are straight lines:
Since translating our intuitive statements to first-order formulas in the language of our frame-models (M's) will be straightforward, we will not give these translations, we will only give the intuitive forms.
The second axiom says that any observer sees himself at rest in the origin:
The third axiom says that we have the tools for thought-experiments: on any appropriate straight line we can assume there is a potential observer; and the same for photons:
The fourth axiom says that all observers "see" the same events (possibly at different space-time locations):
8 For a function f , its range is Rng(f ) := {y : ∃x(f (x) = y)}.
The last axiom says that the velocity of a photon is 1, for each observer:
AxPh v m (ph) = 1 (and tr m (ph) ∈ Lines).
Our choice for a "first possible" axiom system for special relativity is:
Specrel 0 := {AxLine, AxSelf, AxPot, AxEvents, AxPh}.
When we want to indicate explicitly the number of dimensions, we will write Specrel 0 (n) in place of Specrel 0 . We note that AxPh together with the photon part of AxPot is the relativistic part of Specrel 0 . (The rest are true in Newtonian Mechanics.) In [4] we denoted Specrel 0 with Basax (n) for "basic axioms".
Let n > 2. In [4] , [2] we show that Specrel 0 (n) is consistent, it is not independent, and it forbids faster than light observers but permits faster than light bodies. 9 In this paper we show that Specrel 0 generates an undecidable first-order theory but we can strengthen it so that it becomes decidable (moreover categorical); and also we can strengthen it so that it becomes hereditarily undecidable, further both of Gödel's incompleteness properties hold for this strengthened version. We will see that both kinds of extension of Specrel 0 are natural. Now we are going to introduce seven extra natural axioms that will make Specrel 0 categorical over any field. The theory Specrel 0 extended with these seven axioms (and with any decidable theory of fields) is decidable. We will see that if we leave out any one of six of these axioms, the theory will become undecidable, and such that it can be extended to a hereditarily undecidable theory where both Gödel's incompleteness theorems hold.
A principle of relativity
The world-view transformation f mk between two observers m, k is defined as
From our previous axioms it follows that f mk is a transformation of n F (and not only an arbitrary binary relation) if m, k are observers.
10 Therefore we will use f mk as a function. Then f mk (p) is the "place" where k sees the same event that m sees at p, i.e.
n F , we will denote p 0 by p t in order to emphasize that p t is the "time component" of p. Let p, q ∈ n F . Then p t − q t is the time passed between the events w m (p) and w m (q) as seen by m and f mk (p) t − f mk (q) t is the time passed between the same two events as seen by k.
∥ is the rate with which k's clock runs slow or fast as seen by m. Here, ∥a∥ denotes the absolute value of a when a ∈ F , i.e. ∥a∥ ∈ {a, −a} and ∥a∥ ≥ 0.
AxSym All observers see each other's clocks run slow to the same extent,
AxSym states only that any two observers "see" each other's clocks "change" the same way. In principle, this allows the clocks run fast, be right, or run slow. In the Newtonian world AxSym is true because there each observer sees that the other's clocks are right. In models of Specrel 0 , AxSym can be true only in the way that any observer sees that the clock of any other observer not at rest with respect to it runs slow. Figure 7 in the proof of Thm.2.1 shows how it is possible in models of Specrel 0 that both observers "see" the clock of the other run slow.
On the choice of our symmetry axiom AxSym.: Under mild extra assumptions, Specrel 0 implies that AxSym is equivalent with an instance of Einstein's special principle of relativity SP R as it was formalized in [4] , [2] . The principle SP R goes back to Galileo, intuitively it says that the "laws of nature" are the same for all inertial observers. See also Friedman [8, p.153] . We note that in models of Specrel 0 , AxSym is equivalent to the potential axiom requiring that, in space, in the direction orthogonal (in the Euclidean sense) to the direction of the motion there is no relativistic distortion, i.e. there is no length-contraction. Other equivalent formalizations of AxSym can be found in [4, §3.9 ].
Axioms making Specrel 0 categorical
Here we introduce six more axioms that will make Specrel 0 categorical (over any given field). As in section 2.2, in the following m, k stand for observers, ℓ for a straight line, ph i for photons; and free variables in the axioms should be understood as universally quantified.
The first two axioms deal with the direction of flow of time. We define for any two observers m, k
Intuitively this means that time flows in the same direction for m and k, see Figure 4 . Our first axiom is a stronger version of part of AxPot, it says that every appropriate straight line is the life-line of an observer whose time flows "forwards".
The next axiom says that time flows in the same direction for any observers at rest in the origin.
The next axiom says that every observer can "re-coordinatize" his worldview with a so-called Galilean transformation. To formalize the next axiom, first we single out special transformations, that we will call Galilean transformations. A mapping f :
n F → n F is called a Galilean transformation if it preserves Euclidean distance and f (1 t ) − f (0) = 1 t where 1 t = ⟨1, 0, 0, . . .⟩ and 1 denotes the unit element of the field F. In other words, a Galilean transformation is a congruence transformation which is the identity map on t, composed with a translation. See Figure 5 . It is known that a Galilean transformation is a linear transformation composed with a translation, hence the next axiom is a first-order logic one.
Figure 5: A Galilean transformation takes the unit vectors into pairwise orthogonal vectors of length 1, and does not change the direction of the time-unit vector.
The next two axioms say, intuitively, that of each kind of observers and photons we have only one copy (or in other words, according to Leibniz's principle, if we cannot distinguish two observers or photons via some observable properties, then we treat them as equal).
11 In other words, these are so-called extensionality axioms. Id denotes the identity mapping. 11 We could have named these axioms after Occam, too.
The last axiom says that every body is an observer or photon.
In the terminology of e.g. Malament and Hogarth, Specrel 0 , Specrel and Specrel + correspond to causal space-time (or metric-free space-time), spacetime, and time-oriented space-time. Specrel 0 is also strongly connected to the "conformal structure of space-time". When we write "causal spacetime", we have in mind the symmetrized version of the strict "causality relation" ≪. (Sometimes "metric-free space-time", "space-time", "time-oriented space-time" are used.) 12 We did not include Ax↑ into Compl because, as we will see, its effects are different from those of the the elements of Compl. (ii) There is a unique model of Specrel + with field-reduct F, up to isomorphism.
On the proof. We illustrate that in any model of Specrel, all the worldview transformations are so-called Poincaré-transformations (i.e. Lorentztransformations composed with translations), and this is the most important part of the proof of Theorem 2.1. 12 The terminology varies with different authors, but what we wanted to point out is that the levels of abstraction corresponding to Specrel 0 , Specrel and Specrel + seem to be generally distinguished levels of abstraction in the literature of relativity. 13 Intuitively, Ax↑ excludes only one model of two choices, while the rest exclude an infinite number of possibilities, cf. Thm.s 2.1-3.6.
14 We exclude the case n = 2 for simplicity only.
Let m, k be observers in a model of Specrel, we will investigate the worldview transformation f := f mk . It is easy to see that f : Figure 6 illustrates the idea of the proof of this part. Finally, AxSym implies that the length of the unit vectors is fixed, as follows. We write out this part of the proof in more detail, because e.g. it shows how it is possible that both observers see each other's clocks run slow.
Let 1 t = ⟨1, 0, 0, . . .⟩, and let us see where e := f km (1 t ) is on tr m (k). Let a, b and a ′ be as in Figure 7 ; i.e. they are the points on tr m (k) and on t such that the straight line connecting 1 t and a is parallel with x, and the straight lines connecting 1 t and b and connecting a and a ′ are parallel with f km [x] . See Figure 7 . If e = a, then m sees that k's clock shows 1 just when his clock shows 1, because 1 t and a are simultaneous for m. But k will see that m's clock shows a ′ < 1 when his clock shows 1, because for k, e = a and a ′ are simultaneous. So k will think that m's clocks run slow, but m will think that k's clocks are right. Analogously, m thinks that k's clocks are right (run slow or fast, respectively) iff e = b (> b or < b respectively). And, k thinks that m's clocks are right (run slow or fast, respectively) iff e = a (< a or > a respectively). Thus both think that the other's clocks run slow iff b < e < a. The rate of "slowness" is the same for them at a unique point in between a and b, because the change of rate is a continuous and strictly monotonic function (of the "number" ∥e∥). Now, Minkowski-distance is defined so that the Minkowski-distance is 1 between 0 and this unique point (where the rates of "running slow" are the same for m and k). Figure 8 shows the points whose Minkowski-distance from 0 is 1, i.e. it shows Minkowski-circle with radius 1 and center 0. It is known that any collineation is an affine transformation composed with a field-automorphism-induced transformation. Using that the above line of thought is valid for any p ∈ t in place of 1 t , one can show that the worldview transformations are actually affine transformations. Summing up: in models of Specrel, the world-view transformations take the unit vectors into pairwise Minkowski-orthogonal vectors of Minkowski-length 1. These kinds of affine transformations are called in the literature Poincaré-transformations. QED 3 Decidability and undecidability, Gödel's First Incompleteness in relativity
We now turn to decidability questions. Let n > 0 be fixed. It is known that the first-order logic theory of Euclidean geometries (of dimension n) over real-closed fields is decidable (a result of Tarski), cf. e.g. Schwabhäuser et al. [17] . Similarly, the first-order theory of Minkowski geometries (of some fixed dimension n) over real-closed fields is also decidable (a result of Goldblatt), cf.
Goldblatt [9, Appendix A, pp.168-169]. This leads naturally to the question whether our relativity theories T h ⊇ [Specrel + theory of real-closed fields]
are decidable. 15 We will see that the answer depends on what extra "simplifying assumptions" we make (in T h) on the logical sort "Bodies" (and does not depend too much on what "typically relativity theoretic" assumptions we make on observers, photons and world-view transformations such as Ax↑, AxGal, etc.
)
We start by recalling the definition of real-closed fields and by recalling some facts from the literature.
An ordered field F is real-closed if it is Euclidean (i.e. every positive element has a square root), and if every polynomial of odd degree has zero as a value. This last requirement can be expressed with the infinite set {ϕ 2n+1 : n ∈ ω} of first-order formulas, where for every n ∈ ω, ϕ n denotes the following sentence
15 The question remains interesting even if we do not insist on T h ⊇ Specrel, but we will see that the assumption T h ⊇ [theory of real-closed fields] is needed (in some sense) in order to keep the question interesting.
16 E.g. Ax↑ says that if the traces of two observers coincide, then their time flows in the same direction, or we can state in an axiom that if two observers are at rest relative to each other, then there is no relativistic distortion between their world-views.
By a theory we will understand an arbitrary set of first-order formulas (i.e. we will not assume that it is closed under semantical consequence). We call a theory Th decidable (or undecidable respectively) if the set of all first-order semantical consequences of Th is decidable (or undecidable respectively). We call Th complete if it implies either ϕ or ¬ϕ for each first-order formula ϕ (of its language). Propositions 3.1,3.2 below are known in the literature. Prop.3.1 is a corollary of Tarski's famous elimination of quantifiers for realclosed fields.
PROPOSITION 3.1 The theory of real-closed fields is decidable and complete.
PROPOSITION 3.2 The theories of ordered fields and Euclidean fields are undecidable.
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CONJECTURE 3.3 Any finitely axiomatizable consistent theory of ordered fields is undecidable.
For more on this subject we refer to the book of van den Dries [7] . Proof. This is a corollary of Prop.3.2, and the theorem that for any Euclidean field F there is a model of Specrel + with F as the field reduct (Theorem 2.1).: Let ϕ be any field-theoretic first-order formula written by using variables of our quantity sort. Then ϕ is valid in a frame-model M with field reduct F iff ϕ is valid in F. Thus ϕ is valid in the class of Euclidean fields iff ϕ is true in all models of Specrel + . Since the first-order theory of the Euclidean fields is undecidable by Prop.3.2, the first-order consequences of Specrel + is undecidable, too. Since this is a finite theory, then any subset of it is undecidable, too. QED The above suggests that if we want to obtain interesting decision-theoretic results, we have to concentrate on real-closed fields; or at least include a decidable theory of field-axioms into our theories. Let Φ denote the theory of real-closed fields. Proof. We show that (i) and (ii) are corollaries of Theorem 2.1, we sketch the proof of (ii). Let M and M ′ be models of Specrel 0 ∪ Compl ∪ {Ax↑} ∪ Φ. We cannot apply Theorem 2.1 yet, because the field-reducts F and F ′ of M and M ′ respectively may not be the same. But they are elementarily equivalent, because Φ is complete, so by the Keisler-Shelah isomorphic ultrapowers theorem they have isomorphic ultrapowers, say 
ii). (iii) is a corollary of the next theorem; we included it here because it nicely contrasts (i) and (ii). QED
We now turn to the analog of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem.
THEOREM 3.6 Let n > 1 and let Ax be any member of Compl. There is a formula ν (in our frame-language) such that (i) ν is consistent with Specrel 0 ∪ (Compl \ {Ax}) ∪ {Ax↑} ∪ Φ and for any theory T h consistent with ν (ii) T h is hereditarily undecidable in the sense that no consistent extension of T h is decidable. (iii) The conclusion of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem applies to the theory T h, i.e. no consistent recursively enumerable extension of T h is complete; moreover there is an algorithm that to each consistent, recursively enumerable extension T h ′ of T h yields a formula ϕ such that T h ′ ̸ |= ϕ and T h ′ ̸ |= ¬ϕ.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to show that absence of any member of Compl allows us to interpret Robinson's Arithmetic into our theory. We sketch this for the case Ax = AxNoBody. We will see that in this case ν will be quite natural: it will state the existence of a periodically moving body. Consider the following formulas (with free variables m, b and t):
, and
I(t) ∧ I(s)] → [I(t + s) ∧ I(t · s)]).
Add, for a moment, m and b as constants to our language. Then t remains the only free variable of I which then specifies a subset of the fieldreduct in any frame-model: the set of time-points where the observer m sees the body b at the origin. Now the formula ν requires that this subset behaves like the set of integers: it is a discrete periodic subset containing 0, 1 and closed under +, ·. Since the field-reduct of a frame-model is a field, then Robinson's arithmetic will be true in the field-reduct restricted to the subset defined by I. In other words, I is an interpretation of Robinson's Arithmetic in T h ∪ {ν}, whenever ν is consistent with T h. For definition of Robinson's Arithmetic and (semantical) interpretation see e.g. Monk [12, Def.14.17, Def.11.43]. Thus, Robinson's Arithmetic can be interpreted in T h ∪ {ν}. Then T h ∪ {ν} is inseparable (which is a strong version of undecidability) by Thm.16.1 and Prop.15.6 in [12] ; and thus (ii) and (iii) of our Theorem hold by Monk [12, Thm.s 15.9 and 15.8]. Finally, if we omit the constants m, b, then semantical consequence does not change, so (ii) and (iii) will hold for the original language (set of formulas not containing the constants m or b), too (in (iii) a further little argument is needed).
To show (i), we have to construct a model of
. This is not difficult as ν basically states the existence of a periodically moving body; see Figure 9 .
Take a "standard" model with minimum set of observers and photons; and add one periodically moving body. We omit the details of the definition of this model.
The proofs for the other cases are analogous; we only give different interpretations of Robinson's arithmetic. This means that we give a different m b Figure 9 : b is a periodically moving body in m's world-view.
formula I, but ν will be the same (speaking about I), and then we only have to show that T h ∪ {ν} is consistent, where T h is the theory in (i). To give a flavor, we give this new interpretation I for the case when Ax = AxPot + .
I(m, t)
This finishes the proofidea of Theorem 3.6. QED
Since Minkowski geometries over real-closed fields do have a decidable theory (for any fixed n), Theorems 3.4-3.6 above seem to point in the direction that our relativity theories, such as Specrel, are essentially richer than the theories of the corresponding Minkowski-style geometries.
REMARK If we add Compl, and especially AxNoBody to our relativity theory (say Specrel 0 ), then this can be interpreted by saying that we want to abstract away from some aspects of relativity theory and want to concentrate on some very basic aspects only (namely those involving inertial observers and photons). At a certain stage of development, one might even say that this aspect is the "heart" of the theory (from a certain point of view) and for a while one might want to concentrate on the heart only. Some people might even argue that this "heart" part is the one which contains the so called "laws of nature" and therefore immunity of this part to Gödel's incompleteness arguments (cf. Theorem 3.5 above) might point in the direction that perhaps TOE is, after all, possible despite of Gödel's incompleteness proofs because if we figure out carefully which formulas of our frame language count as potential "laws of nature" and distinguish them from the rest of the formulas, then laws of nature conceived in this special way might eventually turn out to admit a complete axiomatization.
We plan to come back to discussing such (and related) kinds of ideas much later, after accelerated observers and other things (in the direction of general relativity) will be incorporated in a variant of our first-order logic approach.
Let us turn, for a second, to the possible "only the heart" approaches, mentioned at the beginning of this remark. In this connection, we would like to emphasize that herein we intend to include into our formalized (and axiomatized) relativity theories not only the heart of the theory but rather "the whole story" (in some sense). In this sense the purposes of this work are different from the purposes of possible works which would want to provide an axiomatic foundation for special relativity by axiomatizing (only) Minkowski geometry in first-order logic. 18 We would call such an approach an "only the heart" approach. (With this we do not want to diminish the importance of such possible approaches. They are legitimate and they are useful. But they do not make our research superfluous, either.)
END OF REMARK
For current research directions in logic started by Gödel's incompleteness theorems we refer to Hájek and Pudlák [10] . In later work we plan to look into the logical structure of general relativistic space-times permitting closed time-like loops (which can be regarded as causing a kind of self-reference 19 ). In Lewis [11, pp.67-80, pp.212-3] it is pointed out that these causal loops do not imply logical contradictions or even logical paradoxes. They simply have more complex logical structures than "linear causation". We plan to extend the mathematical logic based approach to further analyzing these and related possibilities thoroughly and carefully.
In the rest of the paper we will write Basax in place of Specrel 0 .
Gödel's Second Incompleteness in relativity
In Theorem 3.6 above we established that the conclusions of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem apply, among others, to our relativity theory Basax (n) + ν (where ν was a natural extra axiom which is valid e.g. in the "standard" (or intended) models). In other words, we expanded our theory Basax (n) with a natural extra axiom ν (whose truth has never been doubted by anyone), and we saw that Gödel's first incompleteness theorem became applicable to the so expanded version of Basax (n).
Next, we will see that Basax (n) can be expanded with similarly natural axioms Ax(ind) which are similarly true in the "standard models" such that even Gödel's famous second incompleteness theorem becomes applicable to the so expanded version of Basax (n). 
We denote this y by suc(x). The axiom ν + says the following. Robinson's arithmetic Q is true in Z M ; (2) but anyway, since Q is finite, we could add Q to ν + if Q was not automatically true. (This would leave Basax (n) + ν + + Q consistent.) Now, we can comfortably interpret Robinson's arithmetic Q in our theory Basax (n) + ν + , and this way we can prove all those parts of Gödel's incompleteness theorems (together with the related theorems like Rosser's) which hold for Q. But now we want to do more: we want to establish those stronger incompleteness results which hold for Peano's Arithmetic PA (and we want to prove these for [Basax (n)+"some natural assumptions"] in place of PA). To this end we introduce an axiom schema Ax(ind) which postulates a natural induction principle for our models M. For this, we can pretend that Z is part of our language, since we defined Z explicitly by a formula φ Z .
(3) Let ψ(x, u) be a formula with free variables x and u = ⟨u 0 , ..., u k ⟩ such that x is of sort F while u i are of arbitrary (but fixed) sort.
ble it is to describe certain sets (of formulas or of natural numbers). This hierarchy is also known as the "degree of unsolvability". There is an infinite sequence Π We will see that if we are careless in defining our class Intmod ⊆ Mod(Basax (n)) of intended models of relativity, then Th(Intmod) can become at least as hard as Th(ω), i.e., harder than Π 0 k for any k. Roughly speaking, this means that there is a computable function tr : Th(ω) → Th(Intmod) mapping Th(ω) onto Th(Intmod) such that if some magic device (usually called an "oracle") could compute (e.g., enumerate) Th(Intmod), then via tr this would also yield a computation (enumeration) of Th(ω). For the precise definition of Π 0 k -hardness and being "as hard as" (say, Th(ω)) the reader is referred to Odifreddi [14] .
Next we turn to preparing ourselves for stating this Π 0 k -hardness theorem (and also some statements about being independent from ZFC set theory). Let us recall that the "potential axiom" ν in our frame language was introduced around our extension of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem to our relativity theories, cf. theorem 3.6. Intuitively, ν says that there exists a periodically moving body. Next we define a harmless looking class Mod(Arch, n) of models which we will call Archimedean models of relativity. Recall that a field F is called Archimedean if to each r ∈ F there is k ∈ F such that r < k and k is a finite integer, i.e. k ∈ {1, 1 + 1, 1 + 1 + 1, ...}. On the proof. Assume M |= Basax (n)+ν and assume F M is Archimedean. Using the ideas of our earlier "Gödel-oriented" proofs, since ν is assumed, we can define an isomorphic copy of some structure A similar to ω in our model M. But since F M is Archimedean, A will be isomorphic with ω. This way we obtained an interpretation tr of Th(ω) in the theory Th(M) of M.
A little checking reveals that this interpretation is the same for all choices of M. This proves interpretability of Th(ω) in Th(Mod (Arch, n) ). The rest follows from this (since tr is clearly Turing-computable). QED
The above theorem can be interpreted as implying that we really should not require F M to be Archimedean in our relativity theories because this requirement would smuggle in very hard meta-mathematical issues into our formalized relativity theory which issues are probably irrelevant to the original subject matter of relativity. (Cf. in this connection van Benthem [6] and Németi and Sain [13] .) THEOREM 5.3 Let n > 1. Then there is a formula φ in our frame language for relativity theory such that truth of statement (i) below is independent of ZFC Set Theory.
(i)
Mod(Arch, n) |= φ On the proof. We saw in the proof of Thm.4.1 that the theory Th(ω) of full first-order arithmetic can be interpreted (or reconstructed) in our "relativity theory" Th(Mod(Arch, n)), if n > 1. But in Th(ω) there do exist formulas, e.g., ψ, such that the statement ω |= ψ" is independent of ZFC (assuming ZFC is consistent). Such a ψ is the Gödelian formula Con(ZF ). Therefore, if tr is our translation function (from Th(ω) into our frame language) then "tr(ψ) ∈ Th(Mod(Arch, n))" or equivalently "Mod(Arch, n) |= tr(ψ)" is a statement about our (potential) relativity theory whose truth is independent from ZFC. This implies, roughly speaking, that in some models of ZFC Mod(Arch, n) |= tr(ψ) is true while in other models of ZFC the same is false.
QED
The tr(ψ) in the above proof is a formula in our language for relativity theory whose truth in the potential relativity theory ThMod(Arch, n) is unknowable in some meta-mathematical sense. To our minds, this implies that ThMod(Arch, n) would be a bad choice for being our relativity theory. Also, Mod(Arch, n) would be a bad choice for being our intended class of models of relativity theory. For completeness, we note that besides Con(ZF ), there are infinitely many different formulas ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . in the language of ω whose validity in ω is independent from ZFC. Such an example is Con(Con(ZF ) + ZF ), but there are also formulas with the same independence property but of different spirit.
The above theorem can be interpreted as saying that Mod(Arch, n) is much less adequate for studying relativity theory than, e.g., Mod(T h) for some of the purely first-order choices T h (such as e.g., Specrel for relativity theory for the following reason. Unlike e.g. the situation with Specrel, the theorems of Th(Mod(Arch, n)) do not depend so much on our choice of explicit assumptions about relativity, but rather they depend on the properties of the set theoretical universe in which "we are doing our mathematics". This may not sound so bad, but further considerations reveal that this can lead to extremely misleading results, and roughly speaking it can contribute to something which is usually called an "artifact", cf. [13] , Sain [15] . Because of Thm.5.3, when we will want to have something like the Archimedean property in our relativistic models M, then instead of simply assuming that F M is Archimedean (which would produce undesirable side effects), we will follow the non-standard analysis-like methodology elaborated in, e.g., Sain [16] , Andréka-Goranko-Mikulás-Németi-Sain [1] for temporal logics of actions and for nonstandard dynamic logics. This nonstandard methodology is based on adding extra sorts to M representing possibly nonstandard integers and functions mapping these integers into F.
